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ROBERT

S.

RENDELL*

The Allied Bank Case
and Its Aftermath
The two principal legal obstacles in collecting sovereign indebtedness
in the United States are the defense of sovereign immunity and the act
of state doctrine. This article is primarily concerned with act of state
problems, in particular as they arose in the context of Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago;' however, a brief word
is in order on sovereign immunity.
I. Sovereign Immunity
In the United States, the law of sovereign immunity has been codified
by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the Act). 2 Under the
Act, a foreign state, which includes a political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state, is immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States unless one of the statutory
exceptions applies. The principal exception in the sovereign lending area
is a contractual waiver of immunity which the Act recognizes at Section
1605(a)(1). Since these waiver clauses are standard in commercial bank
for a bank in obloans, soveriegn immunity rarely presents a problem
3
borrower.
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1. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 et seq. For a general treatment of the defense of sovereign immunity
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3. In the absence of such' a waiver clause, the bank lender would have to rely on the
"commercial activity" exception provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), which is discussed in
the text following this note.
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However, waiver clauses are not commonly found in international bond
issues. In such a case, the bondholder would have to rely on the "commercial activity" exception in Section 1605(a)(2) to establish U.S. jurisdiction over the sovereign issuer under the Act. The legislative history
of the Act clearly demonstrates that foreign state borrowing, whether in
the form of bank loans or bond issues, is a commercial activity within
the meaning of Section 1605(a)(2). The problem is that, in order to fit
within Section 1605(a)(2), a U.S. lender or bondholder must also establish
that: (1) the borrowing activity was carried on in the United States by
the foreign state, or (2) the borrowing activity was carried on outside the
United States but caused a "direct effect" in the United States. Where
the loan is negotiated or the bonds are sold in the United States, or the
obligations are payable in the United States, or the lender is a United
States person, these requirements should be satisfied and jurisdiction over
the borrower/issuer will be sustained.
However, problems may remain in obtaining execution of a judgment
obtained against a sovereign borrower or in effecting prejudgment attachment. Section 1610 of the Act governs execution and attachment
which, in any event, can only be obtained with respect to property of a
foreign state if such property is used in a commercial activity in the United
States. In most cases, an explicit waiver of immunity from execution and
4
attachment is also required.
In summary, problems of sovereign immunity can be minimized or even
eliminated by carefully drawn waiver clauses in loan agreements or bond
indentures. This is not the case with respect to the act of state doctrine,
to which we now turn.
11. Act of State Doctrine
A.

GENERAL

The act of state doctrine is not a principle of international law, but
rather is a matter of federal law in the United States. The doctrine was
first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1897 in Underhill
5
v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other

sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.

4. Execution is discussed infra at text accompanying note 28.
5. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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More recently, the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino expressed the doctrine in the context of an expropriation case as
follows:6
[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule
in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity
of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence
of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
By refusing to pass judgment on the validity of the actions of a foreign
state, the act of state doctrine renders non-justiciable claims that challenge
such acts, even where United States law is the governing law. The doctrine
is subject to a number of exceptions, and only applies where the property
affected by the foreign action is within that state's territory. 7 This territorial limitation grew out of cases dealing with the expropriation of foreign
assets of U.S. persons, but has recently been applied to breach of contract
cases, including default on international loans. The results of applying
the act of state doctrine to intangible property have not always been
satisfactory.
B.

THE FACTS OF ALLIED BANK

8

Allied Bank International, an Edge Act corporation, was agent for a
syndicate of thirty-nine banks which made certain dollar loans in 1976 to
three Costa Rican banks. Each Costa Rican bank was wholly owned by
the Republic of Costa Rica and subject to the direct control of the Central
Bank of Costa Rica. The three Costa Rican banks executed a series of
promissory notes payable to the syndicate banks. The notes were payable
in U.S. dollars in New York and contained a submission to jurisdiction
in New York. However, there was no provision as to governing law.

6. 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).
7. The draft Revised Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States of

American Law Institute [hereinafter "ALl draft Restatement"], for example, defines the
act of state doctrine at Section 469 as follows:
Subject to a controlling act of Congress or international agreement, courts in the United
States will generally refrain from examining the validity of a taking by a foreign state of
property within its own territory, and from sitting in judgment on other Acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there.
For a criticism of the ALl draft Restatement's position on the act of state doctrine, see
Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement
of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68 (1985).
8. What follows is only a summary of the relevant facts in Allied Bank. For a complete
description of the facts see Zaitzeff & Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the Allied Bank

Case, 40 Bus.

LAW.

449, 469-471 (1985).
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The Costa Rican banks made timely payments under the notes until
1981. In July of that year, in response to deteriorating economic and
financial conditions in Costa Rica, the Central Bank issued regulations
which essentially suspended all external debt payments. In November,
the Costa Rican government blocked all payments of foreign debts in U.S.
dollars. As a result of these actions, the Costa Rican borrowers were
unable to continue payments on the notes.
Allied Bank thereupon accelerated the notes and, in February 1982,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York.

C.

DISTRICT COURT DECISION

On July 8, 1983, the District Court issued its decision in favor of the
defendant Costa Rican banks. 9 The defendant banks had argued that they
could not be sued in the United States under the law of sovereign immunity
and the act of state doctrine. The District Court held that the execution
of the promissory notes was a "commercial activity" within the meaning
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and therefore the action by Allied
Bank was not barred by the defense of sovereign immunity.
However, the District Court sustained the defendants' argument that
the act of state doctrine prevented recovery in this case. In the words of
District Court Judge Griesa:' 0
A judgment in favor of Allied in this case would constitute a judicial determination that defendants must make payments contrary to the directives of
their government. This puts the judicial branch of the United States at odds
with policies laid down by a foreign government on an issue deemed by that
government to be of central importance. Such an act by this court risks embarrassment to the relations between the executive branch of the United States
and the government of Costa Rica.

There was no discussion of the situs of the indebtedness or its relevance
to the applicability of the act of state doctrine to Allied Bank's suit on
the notes.
While the action was still pending before the District Court, the parties
began to negotiate a rescheduling of the outstanding debt. In September
1983 these negotiations came to fruition as the defendant banks, the Central Bank and the Costa Rican government signed a refinancing agreement
with the coordinating agent for Costa Rica's external creditors. Fidelity
Union Trust Company of New Jersey, one of the members of the thirtynine-bank syndicate, refused to accept the agreement. Accordingly, Allied
9. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106
S. Ct. 30 (1985).
10. 566 F. Supp. at 1444.
VOL. 20, NO. 3
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brought an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit on behalf of Fidelity, the sole dissenting bank.'
D.

THE INITIAL SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION

On April 23, 1984, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the
District Court.I 2 The plaintiff had argued on appeal that the act of state
doctrine was inapplicable because the situs of the defendants' obligations
was outside Costa Rica, i.e., in New York. The Second Circuit held that
the location of the debts was not determinative of the outcome of the
suit. In the view of the Second Circuit, even if the property or contractual
obligations affected by the foreign government's actions were located
within the United States, the court would give effect to such actions if
"they are consistent with the policy and the law of the United States."
Drawing an analogy between Costa Rica's rescheduling of its external
debts and a reorganization pursuant to Chapter II of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, the court found that Costa Rica's actions prohibiting payment of
external debts was consistent with U.S. law and policy. The prohibition
of debt payments was, in the court's view, similar to a stay on actions to
collect a bankrupt's debt pending the reorganization of the debtor. Further,
Costa Rica's renegotiation of its debts was consistent with U.S. foreign
policy as evidenced by support for these renegotiations from the legislative
and executive branches of the U.S. government.
The Second Circuit's opinion created shock waves throughout the U.S.
international banking community. Since the Second Circuit was relying
on "comity" considerations rather than traditional act of state principles,
it would no longer be possible for banks to structure their loan agreements
to assure that the situs of the debt would be outside the foreign country
of the debtor.' 3 Thus, there could be no certainty that at some future date
payment of the debt would not be blocked by the imposition of exchange
controls as part of a rescheduling effort sanctioned or favored by the U.S.
government. The plaintiff had sought a reversal on act of state grounds,
but instead was on the receiving end of an opinion which considerably
called into question the legal enexpanded the act of state doctrine and
4
forceability of foreign indebtedness. '
I1. The refinancing nevertheless became effective and the Costa Rican banks have been
making payments to the remaining 38 members of the syndicate.
12. 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (not published in the bound edition of F.2d), vacated, 757
F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S.Ct. 30 (1985).

13. This could be done by having all payments made in New York, a submission to
jurisdiction in New York, and a New York governing law clause.
14. One immediate consequence of the Second Circuit's decision was to require law firms
representing banks making international loans to reconsider their legal opinions and in many
instances to qualify these opinions.
SUMMER 1986
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INTERVENTION OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

The plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing of the Second Circuit's April
1984 decision. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief as amicus
curiae in support of the petition for rehearing. The Justice Department
contended that the case should be reheard because the Second Circuit's
opinion was "based on a misunderstanding of the policy of the United
States on a matter of major consequence."
The government used its brief to clarify its position on the role of private
debt in the debt restructuring process:
[T]he United States Government is concerned that this process will be jeopardized by the Court's decision in this case. In particular, an important element
in the functioning of this process has been the willingness of commercial banks
to reschedule debt and to provide credit to countries undertaking adjustment
efforts. The confidence of lenders in the enforceability of their loan agreements
payable in New York is critical to their willingness to extend international credit.
However, this Court's opinion introduces significant uncertainties into the
process of making and interpreting international financial agreements, leaving
unclear, to debtors and creditors alike, the circumstances under which United

States courts will give effect to a foreign government's actions limiting payments

of obligations in the United States. Consequently, the United States Government
believes that the Court's opinion may well discourage commercial lenders from
providing essential new financing and could adversely affect the taking of adjustment measures. If these developments were to occur, the orderly resolution
of debt problems could be seriously jeopardized.

On the basis of this new information, the Second Circuit granted a
rehearing and ultimately reversed its initial decision in the case. For the
rehearing, the U.S. Government submitted a very strong amicus curiae
brief making the same policy argument and further contending that the
act of state doctrine should not be applied to dismiss Allied Bank's suit.
The Departments of State, Treasury and Justice, and the Federal Reserve
Board joined in the brief. The intervention of the U.S. government in this
litigation effectively turned the tide in favor of the plaintiff.
F.

SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION ON REHEARING

On March 18, 1985, the Second Circuit announced its long-awaited
decision on rehearing: The District Court was reversed and the case was
remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Allied Bank! 15 The
court admitted that, in light of the government's elucidation of its position,
its earlier interpretation of U.S. policy was wrong.1 6 The Second Circuit
was now persuaded that Costa Rica's unilateral restructuring of its private
15. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
16. Id. at 520.
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debt obligations was inconsistent with U.S. policy in this area. Thus,
unlike its previous decision which was based upon international comity,
it was necessary to examine defendants' act of state defense.
The court reviewed recent act of state cases, giving particular emphasis
to the foreign policy considerations which provide the rationale of the
doctrine. These foreign policy concerns have led courts to limit the doctrine to acts of a foreign state within its own territory. 17 Thus, if the situs
of the indebtedness affected by the Costa Rican government actions was
outside Costa Rica, the act of state defense would not apply. Given the
fact that the debt was payable in dollars in New York and the defendant
banks agreed to jurisdiction in New York, the court found that the situs
of the obligations was not Costa Rica, but New York. 18
However, the Second Circuit was not finished: It reiterated that acts
of foreign governments having extraterritorial effect could still be recognized by a U.S. court if "they are consistent with the law and policy
of the United States." 19 Since Costa Rica's unilateral attempt to repudiate
its private, commercial debts is inconsistent with (1) the orderly resolution
of international debt problems, (2) the interests of the United States, a
major source of private international credit, and (3) principles of contract
law, the Costa Rican directives should not be given effect. 20 The court
had come full circle from its comity analysis with which it began its
opinion.
Since there were no material questions of fact and the act of state
defense was the sole defense raised by the Costa Rican banks, the court
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. A complete victory for
Allied Bank!
III. Summary and Conclusion
A.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Where does the law stand after Allied Bank? At least in the Second
Circuit, courts will apply a three-step test in deciding whether to dismiss
an action to enforce a foreign debt:

17. See supro note 7. But cf. Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487, 499 (discussing International Association of Machinists v. Or-

ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982)). In the OPEC case, the activity at issue occurred outside the territories
of the states whose actions were at issue, but the property involved (oil) was located within
the territory of the states.
18. 757 F.2d at 522.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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(1) If the borrower is a foreign state or a state-owned agency or corporation, is the suit barred under the law of sovereign immunity?
(2) If not, is the suit barred under the act of state doctrine? In applying
the act of state doctrine, courts will continue to determine the situs of
the property affected by the actions of the foreign state, and, if the
property is located outside the territory of such state, the doctrine may
21
not be invoked.
(3) If the act of state doctrine is not deemed to be applicable because
the plaintiff's property is located outside the territory of the foreign
state, the actions of such state may still be recognized and given effect
in U.S. courts if the actions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.
Regarding the second step described above, it should be noted that the
Second Circuit has now confirmed the "traditional" approach toward
applying the act of state doctrine to intangible property such as contract
rights and promissory notes. Under this approach, the situs of an obligation is determined by ascertaining where the obligee's (i.e., lender's)
rights may be enforced. In Allied Bank, the Costa Rican banks had agreed
to repay their debts in dollars in New York and had submitted to the
jurisdiction of courts in New York. Even in the absence of a New York
governing law clause, the Second Circuit was able to conclude that the
situs of the debt was outside Costa Rica because the debt was enforceable
in New York. Thus, the act of state doctrine did not apply. In effect, the
court was saying that Costa Rica's exchange control laws would not be
given extraterritorial effect.
One may question whether such a traditional territorial approach is the
appropriate one in the case of intangible property rights. The territorial
limitation on the act of state doctrine arose out of cases dealing with
expropriation of fixed assets and makes sense in this context. Why should
a U.S. court give effect to the expropriating act of a foreign state where
22
the property is located in the United States or some third country?
However, there appears to be less justification for applying a territorial
limitation to intangibles. The situs of an intangible property right is somewhat artificial, and courts using this test seem to have lost sight of the
policy considerations underlying the act of state doctrine. Wouldn't a more
sensible approach be to apply the doctrine to these contract rights only

21. There may, of course, be other reasons for not applying the act of state doctrine such
as the absence of a foreign relations concern or the availability of one of the common law
or statutory exceptions.
22. In fact the second Hickenlooper amendment presently bars application of the act of
state doctrine with respect to property located within the United States where the act of
expropriation violates international law. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). See ALl draft Restatement,
supra note 7 § 470.
VOL. 20, NO. 3
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where foreign policy considerations dictate such a result, regardless of
the situs of the intangible?
B.

COMITY CONSIDERATIONS

Step three noted above demonstrates that the "comity" approach of
the Second Circuit's initial decision has not been extinguished. In fact,
it seems reasonably clear that on rehearing the Second Circuit was not
denying comity as a consideration, but was merely saying that its previous
decision on comity was wrong, i.e., the actions of the Costa Rican government were not consistent with U.S. interests and, therefore, comity
did not prevent the court from deciding the case. This leaves open the
possibility that at some future date comity may be used as a justification
for giving effect to foreign exchange controls or some other foreign governmental action where such action is consistent with U.S. law and policy.
For example, the U.S. government may have encouraged a foreign country
to reschedule its debts and could advise the court that unilateral action
by creditor banks in collecting these debts would be disruptive to the
orderly rescheduling process. Thus, comity cannot be entirely ruled out
as a factor in these cases.
C. IMF

ARTICLE

VIII

2(B)

Another cause for future concern is Article VIII 2(b) of the IMF Articles
of Agreement. 23 Article VIII 2(b) reads in relevant part:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which
are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.

For some reason, this provision was not an issue in the Allied Bank
case. However, if a court determined that (1) a loan agreement or a
promissory note was an "exchange contract," and (2)an exchange control
regulation of a member state was maintained or imposed consistently with
the IMF Articles of Agreement, then a loan agreement or promissory note
which is contrary to such exchange control regulation would be unenforceable. The IMF has never defined the meaning of the term "exchange
contract," and the weight of authority in the United States and the United
Kingdom favors a narrow definition of this term which would exclude
loan agreements and promissory notes. On the other hand, there is authority on the continent of Europe which defines exchange contract to
23. International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, amended, Apr. 30, 1976, 29

U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
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include financial agreements. 24 Accordingly, while Article VIII 2(b) does
not presently pose a significant threat to the enforceability of international
loan agreements in U.S. courts, it may at some future date become an
obstacle if courts adopt the more expansive definition of exchange
contract. 25

D.

THE EXECUTION PROBLEM

Finally, there is the problem of execution against a foreign state alluded
to at the beginning of this article. Put in concrete terms, now that Allied
Bank has a judgment, how does it collect from the Costa Rican banks?
Has it won the battle but lost the war?
The rules relating to immunity of property of a foreign state from attachment in aid of execution or execution upon a judgment are set forth
in Section 1610 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.26 In
relevant part, Section 1610(a) denies immunity only if:
(1) the property is used for a commercial activity in the United States,
and

(2)(a) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment or
execution either explicitly or by implication, or
(b) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based.
If the debtor is a foreign agency or instrumentality engaged in commercial activity in the United States, somewhat broader grounds for attachment or execution are available under Section 1610(b).
These rules will make it difficult for a bank or other creditor to enforce
a judgment against a foreign state in the United States. Even where the
loan agreement or promissory note contains an explicit waiver of immunity from attachment or execution, such attachment or execution may
only be available against commercial property located in the United States.
But this problem pre-dates the Allied Bank case and is properly the subject
of another article.

24. For a discussion of the law in this area, see J.
(1982).

GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE

COURTS,

25. Even if courts adopt an expansive definition, one may question whether Article VIII
2(b) should be applied retroactively to render unenforceable a loan agreement which was
legal, valid and binding on signing, i.e., should the subsequent imposition of exchange
controls be given effect under Article VIII 2(b)?
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
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